19 Nov 2026

feedPlanet Debian

Francesco Paolo Lovergine: Terramaster NASes with Debian, take three: scaling up.

As is often the case in scientific environments, IT solutions grow chaotically, often guided by available funds at the wrong moments, or transient choices for transient goals. Here at work, we are not an exception. Historically, since the birth of the Copernicus European project, the Earth Observation domain has become progressively more demanding about storage, due to the frequency and size of satellite acquisitions, available free of charge for research groups, free to access, but not without maintenance and processing costs, of course.

As a result, we have progressively explored low-cost solutions for downloading and processing Sentinel constellation time series. Over a ten-year window, our needs moved from dozens of terabytes to hundreds of terabytes. We started with simple Synology-based solutions, very optimistically, only to discover that the optimism was not justified. When storage needs to scale up, there are no easy solutions.

The only comparable IT environments are HPC clusters, which operate at a completely different order of magnitude in terms of funding. In that context, the Petabyte order of magnitude is generally achievable by using proprietary/FOSS distributed POSIX filesystems such as GPFS, Lustre, or even Ceph. None of them are exempt from problems from time to time. The sad reality is that maintaining a very large POSIX filesystem requires compromises, and no single solution fits all requirements, starting from cost to flexibility, scalability, and reliability. I wrote about the hidden costs of maintaining self-hosted storage solutions here

Almost ten years ago, we chose GlusterFS as an acceptable compromise for a distributed POSIX filesystem. It is not object storage, but a pure POSIX filesystem with a simple architecture, which fits our environment, where most people rely on the folders-and-files abstraction to organize their data. All nodes and their bricks are equal (no dedicated metadata nodes) and can scale without major limitations with a reasonable number of nodes. In our experience, the real bottleneck is network speed, which can introduce high latency and cause cache issues.

We are now finally moving our old Synology-based distributed filesystem to a pool of TerraMaster U12-500 Plus units, installed with Debian 13. Compared with TerraMaster SOHO products, these rack-mount units can run without any non-free firmware. You must manually enable the usual 9000 MTU jumbo frame for the 10Gb network, which is generally required on all connected hosts and also the switch (in our case, a MikroTik box) to properly manage full bandwidth. We measured average performance around 200MB/sec, which aligns with the average sequential speed of 6Gb SATA HDDs.

Regarding using GlusterFS, the most obvious choice is to use it with XFS as the filesystem for the NAS bricks; this proved in practice to be the optimal configuration, after not-too-nice experiences with Btrfs on Synology DSM. Still, it requires some tuning for periodic checks across the various layers of the storage system. One is about short/long HDD testing, which I already covered in another post. A trickier aspect is managing possible bit rot in the brick filesystems from time to time. While Btrfs, with its COW management, can run low-impact scrubs on both metadata and data, XFS can only partially do the same for metadata through xfs_scrub, which is also, as clearly stated, an experimental feature to use at your own risk. In that regard, it is much better to run GlusterFS scrubbing instead.

While xfs_scrub is as light as the SMART short self-test for HDDs, both RAID checks and GlusterFS bitrot scrub are heavy operations that should run rarely to avoid stressing HDDs and systems, and never at the same time. It is mandatory to avoid overlapping all such operations, and that's a good reason to use systemd timers and run the heavy checks in alternating months.

One suboptimal aspect of our solution is the absence of direct LED control for HDDs, which is unfortunately available only under TOS with a proprietary driver. This is obviously required for disk replacement from time to time, when needed. On the other hand, software support is extended to the lifetime of the Debian distribution, with major upgrades every 3-4 years on average. Also, this is much more flexible and efficient than using pre-built custom OSes. Of course, if you prefer dashboards and the usual GUI candy, this isn't a viable choice; a better option would be TrueNAS, which has a much higher memory footprint, especially when paired with OpenZFS.

19 Nov 2026 6:45pm GMT

18 Nov 2026

feedPlanet Debian

John Goerzen: What is this AI slop bug report trying to achieve?

This morning, I opened up my inbox to find a report of a security bug in C-Kermit. "That's great!", I thought. Someone else interested in C-Kermit found a bug.

Well, as you can imagine from the title of this post, that's not the case at all.

The bug report claimed that a recent security fix was incomplete for non-Unix platforms. It appeared to quote code that lacked hardening. However, the report had specifically deleted the hardening code from the section it quoted. Its suggested fix asked for hardening code… of the exact same shape that is already in the tree, that the report had somehow excluded. Even if the hardening was omitted, from my understanding, the one non-Unix platform that people build C-Kermit on today, OpenVMS, doesn't have the same class of shell bugs that Unix does.

So, the entire report was bunk. It bears every indication of being AI-generated. It arrived in an email with a plain text body, but was formatted Markdown. The writing bore many hallmarks of being AI generated.

But it left me wondering: what is this person trying to achieve?

And this is a bit of a mystery to me. The email I received concluded with:


## Request

I'd be grateful if you could:
1. confirm and fix this,
2. publish a GHSA and request a CVE ID,
3. credit "[REDACTED]" as the reporter.

I wonder what the end game is?

Incidentally, there was no real name used in the report. Only a github username, which I am redacting in this post.

It gets stranger. That person on Github appears to have a 3-year-old account, dormant until today, and created a bunch of repos consisting of logs of submitting reports to projects - all of which happened today.

Stranger, each of these repos contains enough information in the title for people to pretty much figure out what the bug is (if any of them are reporting actual bugs). Yet they claim to be a "coordinated disclosure" when all of this is public. (I got a more detailed report by email). If any of these are real bugs, this public exposure before a fix opens them up to harm. Their username is plastered all over things in unnecessary places: the report file, the description of the repo, etc.

So, what is the point of all this? I don't get it. They targeted a bunch of, frankly rather obscure, projects with low effort, but with evidence of scripting in the Github interactions. Even if they had an LLM do all this for them… why? I don't get it.

Update 2026-11-19: I replied to the reporter's email, calling out the problems with it and calling it AI slop. I received a reply, which was extremely obviously AI written, apologizing profusely and claiming that the original had not been written by an AI. Also, all the repos that were on the account yesterday are gone today. I wonder how many times this pattern has repeated over the last 3 years.

18 Nov 2026 2:03pm GMT

Ludovic Rousseau: New version of pcsc-lite: 2.5.4

I have just released a new version of pcsc-lite 2.5.4.

pcsc-lite is a Free Software implementation of the PC/SC (also known as WinSCard) API for Unix systems. It provides an API for using smart cards and smart card readers.

The hardening configuration used for systemd was problematic in some configurations. I tried to fix it in version 2.5.3 but then it broke other configurations. The solution is to simply remove the PrivateUsers= argument. It is a bit less hardened but it should work everywhere.

Changes:

2.5.4: Ludovic Rousseau

18 November 2026

  • systemd: do not use PrivateUsers= and fix a regression introduced in 2.5.3

  • avoid a bug in polkit

18 Nov 2026 12:03pm GMT